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The Proposed Restatement of Corporate
Governance: Is Reform Really Necessary?
The role of the director in a modern corporation has recently come under
new scrutiny. The American Law Institute has proposed a "Restatement of
Corporate Governance" which offers explicit guidelines for the conduct of
corporate directors. The Institute proposes to increase the board of direc-
tors' responsibility for corporate affairs by raising the board's standard of
care. The Proposed Restatement has, however, been criticized by the bus-i-
ness community for failing to take into account the realities of corporate
governance and for imposing a suffocatingly narrow set of guidelines.
Corporate management is not in need of reform. But even if it were, the
Proposed Restatement is not the solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been a number of recent attempts at corporate re-
form, some governmental, and some private.' Such attempts arise
because of the role that the corporation plays in the world econ-
omy.2 At the root of this reform movement is a belief that direc-
tors are inefficient, and that tighter restrictions are needed to
control their actions.
The American Law Institute (ALI) has entered the fray by
drafting a restatement of corporate law. 3 The proposal is insuffi-
cient, however, because its drafters failed to take a realistic look
at the role that executive officers play in the corporation, and be-
cause they failed to consider the economics of the business world.
For this reason, the Business Roundtable has vigorously criticized
the Proposed Restatement.
This comment focuses on the Proposed Restatement and how
its implementation would detrimentally affect the operation of the
modern corporation.
1. For recommendations of federal regulations to improve corporate govern-
ance, see R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976) [hereinafter cited as NADER]; Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Deriva-
tive Suit An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
261 (1981); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence With
Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57 (1971).
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 544 (1981). In 1980, the largest 500 corporations had assets
in excess of 1,175 billion dollars.
3. See infra notes 18, 25-50 and accompanying text.
I. THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The question of who should control a corporation is indeed per-
plexing. However, it has been just as difficult to determine where
corporate control actually lies. Originally, control was thought to
lie in those persons who actually had the power to select the
board of directors,4 i.e., the shareholders. In the 1920's and 30's,
however, this control theory was deemed impractical; corporate
control was proven to lie with the corporation's directors and of-
ficers.5 This type of control resulted from the wide dispersal of
corporate ownership. In 1932, sixty-five of the two hundred larg-
est non-financial corporations did not have one shareholder with
more than 5% of the corporate stock, presumptive evidence that
ownership and control were not synonymous. 6 Indeed, this "real-
istic" view was enacted in a majority of state corporate laws. 7
The board of directors, however, wields very little actual power.
Most boards meet no more than once a month to discuss
problems.8 This leaves the directors little time to become familiar
with the problems facing the corporation, and much less time to
come up with appropriate remedies. Actual control is thus
wielded by the corporation's executive officers. 9 This characteri-
4. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
69-70 (1933). Berle and Means characterized five types of control: (1) control
where one person owns nearly all of the corporation's stock; (2) majority control
where one person holds the most stock; (3) control through a legal device such as
a trust or pooling agreement; (4) minority control; and (5) management control.
The first three types are based on the right of the majority to vote its stock, while
the last two are based on a factual, rather than a legal, basis of control. Id. at 70.
5. Id. at 69-70.
6. Id. at 94-118. Additionally, only 12% of the corporations were controlled by
a majority, while 23% were controlled by minority blocks of shares, and 65% were
controlled by management. Id.
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1980) ("[Tjhe business...
of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) ("[T]he business
of a corporation shall be managed under ... its board of directors"); MODEL Busi-
NESS CORP. ACT § 35 (2d ed. 1977) ("All corporate powers . . . shall be managed
under the direction of, a board of directors").
8. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 140-41 (1976) (most
boards meet less than 36 hours per year). See also Mace, Designing a Planfor the
Ideal Board, 54 HARv. Bus. REV. 20 (1976).
9. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 17, 215
(5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as CARY]. See also J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND
THEIR FUNCTIONS-A PRELIMINARY STUDY 12 (1945); R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADER-
SHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 79-90 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as GORDON];
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
125-27 (1975). Mandatory or permissive appointment of officers is generally pre-
scribed by statute and most often enumerated in the corporate bylaws. The offices
include a president, one or more vice-presidents, treasurer, and secretary. The
chief executive officer is usually the president and often times chairman of the
board. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 4, 586-87 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HENN].
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zation of corporate control has been called the working model of
corporate governance. 10 In the working model, the board of direc-
tors has been relegated to the role of a rubber stamp for the of-
ficers' decisions.1 Indeed, one noted economist has said: "While
the board's approval function was more important than its initiat-
ing activities,... 'even with respect to approval, many boards in
these large companies are almost completely passive,' and ...
the final approval function was usually exercised by the chief
executive. ... "12
The failure of the board to manage the corporation does not
stem from the fact that the board has a lack of interest in the
management of the corporation. Rather, it is a reflection of the
fact that the board is on the outside of every managerial deci-
sion.13 Many boards have been, and still are, primarily composed
of inside directors,14 making the chief executive officer the domi-
nant member.15 The board's information is usually prepared by
the chief executive or another executive officer, who typically
presents only management's viewpoint.' 6 Additionally, corporate
directors usually receive a minimal salary, indicating their insig-
nificant role in providing proper management.' 7
10. CARY, supra note 9, at 215. The working model "embodies actual corporate
practice." Id. It is to be distinguished from the monitoring model. See infra notes
19-24 and accompanying text.
11. Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, The Monitoring Board and
the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623, 625 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Dent]. An example of rubber stamping occurs when the president proposes a res-
olution to give him authority to make a contract for the sale of land and the direc-
tors approve the sale without any discussion.
12. GORDON, supra note 9, at 128-29.
13. CARY, supra note 9, at 215.
14. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGES, THE CHANGING BOARD UPDATE 3 (1978) [herein-
after cited as HEIDRICK]; H. KooNTz, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT 123 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KOONTz]. An inside director is also
an officer of the corporation or of other corporations affiliated with it. See HENN,
supra note 9, at 553.
15. Dent, supra note 11, at 621. See HEIDRICK, supra note 14, at 6; see also
Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS
LJ. 1353, 1356 (1979). The chief executive becomes the dominant member of the
board because the other insiders, as officers, are his subordinates in the daily ac-
tivity of the corporation and are, therefore, reluctant to disagree when the chief
executive makes a board proposal.
16. M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALrrY 73, 107 (1971). Even if the board
was composed of outside directors, the outside directors would usually be execu-
tives of other companies and would have neither the desire nor the understanding
of another corporation's problems to analyze management proposals with vigor.
17. KOoNTz, supra note 14, at 147. In the managerial hierarchy, directors are
the lowest paid. In addition, former Securities and Exchange Commission Chair-
Many authorities believe that there must be a revamping of the
corporate structure.18 The model most heavily touted is the moni-
toring model. 19 This model gives the board the duty of monitor-
ing the functions of the company and its officers. 20 These duties
include: (1) the selection, evaluation, and removal of the corpora-
tion's executives;21 (2) the fixing of salaries of top management; 22
(3) review of transactions between the corporation and its insid-
ers;23 and (4) oversight of management's compliance with the
law. 2
4
III. THE MONITORING MODEL V. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
A. The Proposed Restatement
The American Law Institute (ALI)25 sought to make corporate
operation easier in both the short and long run. The ALI hoped
its proposal would enable the corporation to maximize profits
without worrying about control of the corporation. 26 The ALI's
man Hills said that the directors' compensation is set at such a low figure that no
work can really be expected of them. Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 327-28 (1976).
18. E.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATE-
MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE]. Another example is the
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Many
states have agreed with the principle and have enacted it into their corporation
codes. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-57 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101 (Supp. 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(a) (West Supp. 1983-84); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1
(West Supp. 1983-84); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.34 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); VA. CODE
§ 13.1-35 (1978). It appears that many other states will follow this trend. See also
Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (suit by shareholders against
board alleging breach of fiduciary duty by authorizing or ratifying corrupt busi-
ness practice by corporation, i.e., bribes to foreign purchasers, foreign government
officials, and their agents).
19. Under the monitoring model, the board of directors is no longer charged
with the management of the corporation but with the oversight of corporate activi-
ties. The board's role will be to hold the executive accountable for adequate re-
sults, while the executive's role will be to achieve such results. CARY, supra note
9, at 219.
20. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
57-66.
21. Id. at 63-66.
22. Id. at 106-14.
23. Id. at 66-67.
24. Id. at 65-66.
25. The ALI is composed of over 1,800 leading lawyers, judges, and law profes-
sors. It was designed to clarify and simplify the law, and to adapt it to social
needs. It clarifies common law rules and summarizes that which has been decided
by state courts. Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, 60 HARV. Bus.
REV. 34, 35 (Nov.-Dec. 1982) (as reproduced in STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUND-
TABLE, infra note 46) [hereinafter cited as Andrews].
26. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18.
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answer was the Restatement of Corporate Governance. 27 In the
Proposed Restatement, the ALI offered bright line rules28 under
which the corporate entity would function. Section 2.01 of the
Proposed Restatement states that the "objective ... of the Busi-
ness Corporation" is shareholder profit, unless it would be real-
ized from illegal or unethical conduct. The ALI also sought to
"delineate and clarify the proper role of a director and to describe
the director's duties, obligations, and responsibilities." 29
The ALI set out to obtain these goals by suggesting five changes
in the director's duties. The ALI first proposed to place a series of
oversight responsibilities on the board of directors to monitor
every other director and, more importantly, the executive of-
ficers. 30 This is the basic monitoring model.31 Second, the ALI
proposed that a majority of the board be composed of outside di-
rectors 32 free from any economic or personal relationships with
the corporation's senior executives. 33
Third, the ALI proposed three types of committees: an audit,34 a
nomination, 35 and a compensation committee. 36 The proposal
makes the audit committee mandatory. Its primary function
would be to nominate the corporation's independent auditor, to
supervise the relationship between the firm and the independent
27. Id. The draft of the ALI proposal was to have been voted on in May, 1982
at the ALI's annual meeting. However, due to opposition, the ALI postponed the
vote until May, 1984.
28. A bright line rule is a clearly defined law. In other words, it is a specific
law meant to guide activity.
29. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
XXV.
30. Id. at 57-70.
31. Id. Under this model, the board would monitor the conduct of the corpora-
tion's business, implement major plans, and oversee the corporation's use of
resources.
32. The ALI defines an inside director as one with a significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives. Id. at 71. The AL seems to define an
outside director as one free of any significant relationship with the corporation's
senior executives. Id.
33. Id. This standard, according to the AL, is for all large publicly-held corpo-
rations unless a majority of the company's voting securities are owned by one per-
son or family. Id. The AI defines a "large, publicly-held corporation" as one
which has 2,000 or more stockholders and $100 million or more in total assets. Id.
at 6.
34. Id. at 82-95.
35. Id. at 97-106.
36. Id. at 106-14.
auditor, and to choose the appropriate accounting principles. 37
The nomination and compensation committees are not required,
but are strongly recommended. The function of the nomination
committee would be to evaluate potential candidates for member-
ship on the board and to monitor the performance of the board's
present directors. 3 8 The compensation committee's job would be
to determine the compensation of senior management. 39
Fourth, the duty of care for directors would be greatly ex-
panded under the ALI's proposal. The proposal requires the di-
rectors not only to carry out their responsibilities in good faith
and in a manner thought to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, but also to perform their duties with the degree of care that
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to ex-
ercise in a similar position, under similar circumstances. 40 This
standard of care would curtail the "business judgment rule" 41
which currently requires a director to use only good faith, and
which would hold him liable only for gross negligence. 42
Finally, the proposal facilitates shareholder derivative suits, 43
and makes them more difficult to terminate. The Proposed Re-
statement would remove present procedural barriers44 to bringing
the derivative suit.45
The ALI proposal has already faced strong opposition. 46 The
37. ABA See. Corp., Banking and Bus. Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook,
33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1623-27 (1978).
38. Id. at 1626.
39. Id.
40. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANcE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
141-216. Section 4.01 is an integration of the business judgment rule with ordinary
negligence standards.
41. Under the business judgment rule, a director is not liable for decisions
which are made in good faith, absent a showing of gross negligence. The ALI
sought to reduce the gross negligence standard to ordinary negligence, thus cur-
tailing the liberal approach the courts have taken in holding directors liable under
the traditional business judgment rule.
42. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973) (discussing the rationale of the business judgment rule); Slensky
v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (declining to interfere with the
business judgment of directors absent a clear showing of dereliction of duty).
43. A shareholders' derivative suit is a suit brought by stockholders on behalf
of the corporation. HENN, supra note 9, at 1035.
44. The business judgment rule is used to bar derivative actions. The board
sets up an independent committee of directors to determine if the accused direc-
tor's actions were in the best interests of the company. If they were, then the
board of directors dismisses the suit. Sections 7.01 through 7.05 of the PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, seek to eliminate the
use of the independent board in determining shareholder derivative suits.
45. "As a general rule the plaintiff [shareholder] must first make a demand on
the board of directors that the corporation take the steps necessary to enforce its
cause of action." HENN, supra note 9, at 1069.
46. E.g., THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE'S CORPORATE RESPONSIBILrrY TASK FORCE,
STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRO-
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business community claimed that it was not ready for four law-
yers to tell them how a corporation should be run.47 Business
also objected to the Proposed Restatement on two grounds: proce-
dural and substantive.48 The procedural objection resulted from
the business community's belief that the ALl had departed from
its traditional role of clarifying existing principles of law to recom-
mending what new corporate law should provide.49 The substan-
tive objection was that the drafters of the Proposed Restatement
did not know enough about the operations of the boards of direc-
tors to be an authority on the subject.5o
B. The Business Roundtable Report
The group primarily responsible for criticizing the ALI's Pro-
posed Restatement is the Business Roundtable.51 The Business
Roundtable agreed with the ALI that efficiency should be the
main goal of corporate governance,52 but objected to the "bright
line rules that were proposed [because they] would not provide
efficiency but would in fact provide an over-emphasis on litiga-
tion."5 3 The Roundtable declared that the ALI proposal would
lead to serious consequences. 54
The consequences characterized by the Roundtable as being
imminent were: (1) an inability to be flexible and adaptive to
POSED "PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE]. The ALI is overstepping its bounds by recommending new law
rather than adhering to past practices of summarizing current law. Evidence of
this can be seen in Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir.
1982), where the court affirmed the adoption of section 7.02 of the ALI's tentative
draft. See also Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement 35 VAND. L REV.
1259, 1265 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fischel] (no problem exists in the area of
corporate governance that needs to be addressed).
47. Andrews, supra note 25, at 35.
48. Id.
49. Id. Technically, the ALI can depart from traditional inquiries as "long as
the outcome is subject to the approval of its members." Id.
50. Id. at 36. The ALI should have consulted more businessmen and econo-
mists who deal with directors on a daily basis for their input on a new corporate
governance scheme. Id. at 37.
51. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 46. The Business
Roundtable has a membership of 180 persons, each member a chief executive of a
major corporation. It was formed to discuss current problems facing large corpo-
rations and to issue recommendations.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
changing markets and competition; (2) an increase in costs to the
corporation accompanied by decreased corporate productivity; (3)
an unwillingness and inability to take corporate risks that would
be necessary to maintain competitiveness; (4) a focus by the di-
rector on short-term rather than long-term performance; and (5)
an unwillingness among qualified people to serve on a corpora-
tion's board.55
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED RESTATEMENT ON THE
DIRECTOR'S DUTIES
A. Profit Maximization
Shareholders invest in a large, publicly-held corporation to
make a profit through dividends and the subsequent sale of their
shares.5 6 The investors are willing to supply capital to enable the
corporation to operate efficiently because they trust the abilities
of the corporate executives. 5 7
Imposition of the Proposed Restatement's monitoring function
may, however, decrease earnings available for dividends by in-
creasing both direct and indirect costs of governance.5 8 The addi-
tional direct costs would include extra staff members, salaries,
and an increased level of bureaucracy.5 9 The direct cost increases
would occur because of the increased role of the director in moni-
toring the corporation's business. 60 The director will demand an
increase in his salary proportionate to the extra duties and liabili-
ties he would assume under this function.6 1 To become involved
in the day-to-day operation of the corporation, the director would
need a large staff to advise him of issues that must be ad-
dressed.62 This increase in director's knowledge would, therefore,
55. Id.
56. The goal of most investors is to buy shares at a low market rate and sell
when the market is high. Therefore, as long as the corporation is making money,
shareholders will generally not question who is controlling the corporation.
57. A conference board study by the Business Roundtable showed that ap-
proximately 93% of surveyed companies have audit committees, 90% have com-
pensation committees, and 23% have nomination committees. THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2105-06 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as The Role and, Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation].
58. Fischel, supra note 46, at 1282.
59. Id.
60. The director must now become knowledgeable in all phases of the com-
pany's operation in order to make an informed and intelligent decision.
61. For the new liability standard proposed by the ALI, see PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GovERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at 241-378.
62. The director alone cannot possibly become familiar with all aspects of a
corporation, especially in a technical field (e.g., the drug industry). The corpora-
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unnecessarily add to the numerous levels of corporate bureau-
cracy already in existence.
The indirect costs are not as obvious.6 3 The ALI's proposed re-
quirement of a majority of outside directors may cause a loss of
experience on the board.64 The directors, therefore, may not
know when to go through with a merger, develop or produce a
new product, or fire the existing officers. 6 5 Conservative decisions
would result from the outside director's desire to minimize his lia-
bility and his refusal to take the risks necessary for the company
to prosper. Accordingly, the stockholder may lose prospectively
high dividends because of these conservative business decisions.
While the proposed monitoring committees would benefit se-
nior management by relieving them of some of their present du-
ties, investors will have a tough time justifying their added
expense. For example, the improved accounting principles formu-
lated by the audit committee would increase the company's ac-
counting expense,66 leaving less money for the investor.6 7 A
compensation committee might not be the best solution in deter-
mining salaries of senior management. A better method might be
to examine market constraints and to develop the incentive
needed to get managers to monitor each other.68 Additionally, the
job of nominating the directors and officers could be more effi-
ciently undertaken by the directors and officers who have a stake
in the corporation's outcome.69
The costs produced by the ALI's increased board monitoring
function are, however, ones which can easily be avoided by less
tion would have to hire research assistants for the directors in order to satisfy this
test.
63. Fischel, supra note 46, at 1282.
64. Id. The firm's decision-making processes will become less effective. The
experience of the board will decrease because many corporations will have to go
into the market and seek new people to serve on their boards.
65. Remarks of Irving S. Shapiro, Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon
University 11-12 (Oct. 24, 1979). See also Fischel, supra note 46, at 1282.
66. Development of a new system of accounting takes time and money. It re-
quires the hiring of accountants and time spent by the directors on the audit
committee.
67. Fischel, supra note 46, at 1283. "Accounting changes in which real earn-
ings were not affected do not fool investors--they do not cause investors to re-
evaluate the prospects of the firm." Id. See also Sunder, Relationships Between
Accounting Changes and Stock Prices: Problems of Measurement and Some Em-
pirical Evidence, 11 J. ACcT. RESEARCH 138 (1978).
68. Fischel, supra note 46, at 1283.
69. Id.
intrusive means.70 Forces that are presently in existence will
serve to protect the shareholder's financial interests. These
forces include laws promulgated to regulate corporations,71 as
well as antitrust,72 securities, 73 and tax laws.74 These laws ensure
that the corporation will follow certain minimum standards. Even
so, market forces may be the best way to make a corporation prof-
itable. According to Professor Alfred E. Kahn,75 competition will
ensure that corporate production remains efficient by the "objec-
tive test of market survival;[76] it will enable producers to offer
their customers services for which they are willing to pay, and it
will insure labor allocation into production lines creating the max-
imum contribution to total output."7 7 These constraints will pro-
vide the basis for maximizing profits without legal interference.
"The ability freely to sell one's shares, . . . the so-called 'Wall
Street Rule,'[78] is without question the single most important
safeguard to all shareholders that [the executives of the corpora-
tion] will act in their best interests."79
B. Acting Within Legal Boundaries
It is important that every corporation act within the boundaries
70. The costs can be avoided by placing a sufficient number of inside directors
on the board to allow the directors to run the company. See infra notes 115-16 and
accompanying text.
71. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 316 (West 1977) (director liability for the illegal au-
thorization of dividends, distributions, or purchase of shares). See also I.M. MILL-
STEIN & S.M. KATSH, THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER (1981).
72. Four major antitrust regulations have been passed. The Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (prohibiting unreasonable restraints upon
and monopolization of trade in interstate or foreign commerce); Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982) (limits unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce); Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982) (prohibits
price discrimination); Robinson-Patman Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-21(a) (1982)
(provides for enforcement of antitrust proceedings in the courts and before the
Federal Trade Commission).
73. E.g., The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982) (dealing with the ini-
tial issue of securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982)
(dealing with the secondary distribution of securities).
74. I.R.C. § 341 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (while a sale of corporate shares ordina-
rily results in capital gains treatment, certain provisions make it subject to treat-
ment as ordinary income).
75. A.E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTION
(1970).
76. Id. at 15-16.
77. Id.
78. The Wall Street Rule involves the buying and selling of securities on one
of the exchanges or over the counter.
79. Fischel, supra note 46, at 1278. If a shareholder is not satisfied with man-
agement he can sell his shares on the open market. This will cause stock prices to
be reduced and force management to make the necessary changes. Most
shareholders find it easier to sell their shares than to bring a costly shareholders'
derivative suit.
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of applicable state and federal laws. Through the Proposed Re-
statement, the directors would be required to know all applicable
laws8 0 and ensure management's compliance with them.
However, directors cannot guarantee that every manager in a
large corporation will engage in lawful activity.81 This difficulty
arises because the legal and regulatory requirements currently
imposed on corporations are so numerous and complex that it
would be impossible for the board of directors to realize when
certain laws were being violated.82 Each director would have to
be an experienced lawyer with a background in securities and an-
titrust law in order to ensure management's compliance. 83
The board can most effectively ensure the corporation's compli-
ance with relevant laws by hiring the best management avail-
able.84 Through the informal and subjective process of hiring, the
board will best be able to assess the manager's individual integ-
rity and sense of professionalism. 85 This informal process will en-
gender a relationship of mutual trust between the board and top
management. 86 Maintaining high employment standards will en-
sure managers with the requisite technical knowledge. The Re-
statement's black letter rules cannot replace this very human and
flexible process; indeed, it is ludicrous to allow directors, who
know little about an area such as federal securities laws,87 to at-
tempt to monitor top management's decisions in that area.88
80. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
241-378.
81. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, supra note 57, at 2101.
82. Id. Strong policies and procedures are needed which are designed to pro-
mote and maintain legal compliance throughout the corporate structure.
83. The law in this area covers many volumes. For a discussion of securities
and antitrust law, see generally D. RATNER, SEcITrrIES REGULATION: MATERIALS
FOR A BASIC COURSE (2d ed. 1980); H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK
(1980); A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (3d ed. 1980).
84. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 136, Division of Research,
Harvard Business School (1945) [hereinafter cited as BAKER].
85. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of theLarge Publicly
Owned Corporation, supra note 57, at 2102. An arbitrary exclusion of inside direc-
tors frustrates the objective of a board having a broad range of backgrounds and
perspectives. Id. at 2107.
86. Id. at 2102.
87. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
88. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, supra note 57, at 2102.
C. Devotion of Resources Toward Social Goals
Section 2.01 of the Proposed Restatement 89 allows corporate re-
sources to be devoted, within reasonable limits, to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.90 How-
ever, this devotion of resources may be inconsistent with the goal
of maximizing shareholders' profits. The ALI has "[fallen] into
the trap of defining profit, not as the necessary result of or reward
for the pursuit of product-market and organization-sustaining
objectives, but as the only goal, one so all encompassing and
vague that it sets no direction."9 1
Whether a corporation should have a social conscience is a de-
bate that has gone on for over sixty years. Ralph Nader92 and
E.M. Dodd93 argue the managerialist view94 which espouses that a
corporation can and should devote itself to the public interest,
while Milton Friedman 95 and A. Berle9 6 support the view that the
89. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
17.
Corporate law should provide that the objective of the business corpora-
tion is to conduct business activities with a view to corporate profit and
shareholder gain, except that, even if corporate profit and shareholder
gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its
business
(a) is obliged to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law,
(b) may properly take into account ethical principles that are generally
recognized as relevant to the conduct of business,
and
(c) may devote resources, within reasonable limits, to public welfare, hu-
manitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id.
90. Andrews, supra note 25, at 38.
91. Id.
92. R. NADER, THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING in CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 67 (1973).
93. Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Man-
agers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935); Dodd, For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932). These two articles were E.M.
Dodd's half of the famous Berle-Dodd debates of the 1930's concerning corporate
governance.
94. Managerialism, as an involuntary duty, has never been enforced by the
courts. The courts will not impose a duty on the corporation to donate money to
social causes without the consent of the directors. See generally Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1973). The argument
in support of the managerialistic view is the concern that the public will have con-
fidence in a business that does not try to balance its interests with the public's
interest. Williams, The Role of the SEC in Overseeing the Accounting Profession,
Address at Oxford, England 38 (March 13, 1980). See also Kripke, The SEC, Corpo-
rate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAw. 173, 183 (1980).
95. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). In a Playboy interview,
Milton Friedman said: "A corporate executive's responsibility is to make as much
money for the stockholders as possible; ... [when] an executive decides to take
action for reasons of social responsibility, he is taking money from someone else-
from the stockholders.. . ." Friedman further stated that: "I wouldn't buy stock in
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primary aim of the corporation is profit maximization for the
shareholders. Berle believes that it is impossible to measure pub-
lic policy claims against stockholder claims. 97
One of the first cases to recognize the issue of social interest
versus profit maximization was Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 98 which
stated the Berle view. In Dodge, the court stated that a business
corporation is organized primarily for stockholder profit, and the
director's discretion is to be exercised in light of that end, and
such discretion "does not extend ... to the reduction of profits,
or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
benefit the public, making profits of the stockholders incidental
thereto."99
However, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 100 Jus-
tice Brandeis stated in a concurring opinion that while stockhold-
ers may invoke judicial remedies to enjoin management acts
which threaten their property interests, they cannot secure the
aid of a court to arrest mistakes of judgment.101 Thus, if manage-
ment in good faith elects to donate money to charitable interests,
the decision cannot be questioned as long as it was made in good
faith and was reasonable. It appears, therefore, that under ex-
isting law, management may donate a reasonable amount for
charitable purposes. 0 2
This objective would not be furthered by the Proposed Restate-
ment. The directors would still be subject to shareholder's deriva-
a company that hired that type of leadership [referring to managerialism]." Inter-
view with Milton Friedman, Playboy Mag., Feb. 1973, at 59.
96. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1931);
Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365
(1932) [hereinafter cited as For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note ].
These articles were Berle's side in the Berle-Dodd debates.
97. Berle said in For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, supra
note 96, "you cannot abandon emphasis on the view that business corporations ex-
ist for the sole purpose of making profits for their shareholders until such time as
you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsi-
bilities to someone else." Id. at 1367.
98. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (profits are the main goal of the corpo-
rate director).
99. Id. at 475, 170 N.W. at 684.
100. 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (management may elect to donate money, and if it is
done in good faith, it is protected by the business judgment rule).
101. Id. at 343.
102. Id. Within recognized limits, shareholders may invoke judicial remedies to
enjoin acts of management which threaten their property interests.
tive suits because of their failure to comply with section 2.01.103
The outside directors, not knowing the proper method to allocate
resources, would subject all directors to the possibility of losing
their jobs because of shareholder pressure to maximize profits.
Thus, if the monitoring model is accepted, the board will tend to
be committed toward financial, rather than social, goals.l0 4
D. The Outside Director
The ALI has called for the board to consist of a majority of
outside directors.' 05 Under the monitoring model, the outside di-
rectors are asked to monitor management, rather than manage
the corporation.1 0 6 However, the outside director requirement
may severely limit the board. Insiders bring to the board intimate
knowledge of the business operation which can be very valuable
in arriving at a sound business judgment. 0 7
(A] "good" board is something more than a combination of "good" direc-
tors, and that among other things not all directors-even skilled and quali-
fied directors-"fit" all boards equally well; that there had to be some
"mix" in a board-a mix of skills, backgrounds or personalities that create
a chemistry in the board; that there had to be an attitude toward the
board-and especially an "environment" in board meetings-that en-
couraged board participation; and finally that there had to be board man-
agement or "leadership" that directed and coordinated the board and its
work.1
0 8
A good board, therefore, does not need a majority of outside di-
rectors.10 9 The insider may have a vast array of skills and back-
ground able to assist the board in difficult decision-making
103. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE,
supra note 18, at 241-378.
104. Directors would then become committed to making conservative decisions.
The director might be hesitant to make a decision which would enhance the repu-
tation of the company, and would only strive for profit maximization through tradi-
tional means.
105. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
106. For a detailed discussion of the monitoring model, see C. BROWN, PUTTING
THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 4-11, 27-29 (1976); Dent, The Revolution in Corpo-
rate Governance, The Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L.
REV. 623 (1981); Soderquist, Toward a More Effective Corporate Board, Re-examin-
ing Roles of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1341 (1977); Comment, Corporate
Governance and Shareholders' Derivative Action: Rules and Remedies for Imple-
menting the Monitoring Model, 3 CARDOzO L. REV. 627 (1982).
107. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 46, at 23.
108. Id. at 23 (quoting J. LYNCH, ACTrVATING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: A STUDY
OF THE PROCESS OF INCREASING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 333-34 (1979) (available in
Harvard Business School Library)).
109. Presently, 83% of manufacturing companies and 86% of non-manufactur-
ing companies have a majority of outside directors. The Role and Composition of
the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, supra note 57, at
2109. This shows that companies are deciding the proper mixture for a good board;
the rules of the Proposed Restatment are, thus, not necessary to control the board.
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processes. 10 The limitation of the number of insiders would
hamper the objective of including those on the board with the
best skills, backgrounds, and personalities."'
The goal of the corporate enterprise should not be an exclusion
of insiders serving on the board of directors, but one of ensuring a
proper mixture between the inside and outside directors." 2 What
a corporation should look for in determining the composition of
its board members is not the close personal tie the individual has
with the corporation, but the integrity, ability, alertness, experi-
ence, and interest of the particular individual.113
The major concern should be to select as many outside direc-
tors as are needed so that they will have a substantial impact on
the board's decision-making process." 4 This is referred to as the
critical mass theory." 5 If every board needed a majority of
outside directors, there would be a limited pool of capable per-
sons available for the position.116 The number of directors capa-
ble of making complex corporate analysis is limited, and the
"disqualification of insiders would reduce the selection pool to a
still smaller number, [with] the net result.. . [being] corporate
boards whose members were less competent and effective than
those now sitting."" 7
There is nothing inherently wrong with having outside directors
on the board, but the main goal should be to strive to maximize
shareholder wealth.118 This can be achieved by increasing spe-
cialization on the board and by allowing individuals with specific
backgrounds and expertise to join.
110. For example, placing a securities expert on the board would enable it to
analyze and recommend specific procedures to the entire board regarding merg-
ers, while an accountant on the board would be able to recommend and devise the
most appropriate accounting system.
111. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, supra note 57, at 2107.
112. Id. at 2108.
113. BAKER, supra note 84, at 136.
114. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, supra note 57, at 2108.
115. Id. "Critical mass" means that although there may be a majority of inside
directors, there should be enough outside directors to influence the decision-mak-
ing process.
116. Remarks of Irving S. Shapiro, Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon
University 11-12 (Oct. 24, 1979).
117. Id.
118. This is a goal that ha§ been strived for by Friedman and Berle. See supra
notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
E. Uniform Duty of Care
Through a series of judicial decisions, courts have held a direc-
tor liable in three main types of cases: (1) when a director is
guilty of "an obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight
or supervision;"" 9 (2) when a director commits an illegal act;120 or
(3) when a director ignores facts sufficient to put him on notice
that further inquiry and/or action is required.121 Only a small
number of courts have found directors liable for simple
negligence.l 22
The courts have recognized that litigation occurring after the
fact is an imperfect way to evaluate the decisions of the direc-
tor. 2 3 Business decisions are generally immediate determina-
tions usually based on less than perfect information. These
circumstances are not easily reproduced in a courtroom years
later. "[I]t is very much in the interest of shareholders that the
law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate
decisions."124
The Restatement, however, proposes to eliminate the business
judgment rule and subject the directors to a higher standard of
care. The commentary to sections 4.01(a) through (c) of the Pro-
posed Restatement asserts that the duty of care standards "are
intended to establish at least as rigorous a duty of care test as
would the 'personal business affairs' standard."125 In addition,
section 4.01 would hold the directors to a duty of inquiry, and thus
presumably ensure compliance with the law.126 The director can
raise the business judgment rule only after he makes a reason-
119. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 46, at 41 (quoting
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983)).
See also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981); DePinto v.
Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967).
120. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 46, at 41. See, e.g.,
McDonnel v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974); Heit v.
Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
121. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 46, at 41-42. See, e.g.,
Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y. 351 (1909).
122. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifi-
cation of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078-99 (1968) (a search for
cases in which directors have been liable for ordinary negligence).
123. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. The courts must allow the directors to take risks for
the company to be able to prosper.
124. Id.
125. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
151. The "personal business affairs" standard is that a director or officer would
normally work harder when fulfIlling his corporate obligations than if his personal
standards were involved. See generally Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563,
573-74, 334 A.2d 634, 640-41 (1966); Mace, The President and the Board of Directors,
50 HARv. Bus. REV. 37, 48-49 (Mar.-Apr. 1972).
126. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at
141.
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able inquiry to determine that his decision was correct. 127
The ALI's duty of care proposal would make it almost impossi-
ble for a corporation to dismiss a shareholder's derivative suit
challenging the director's conduct.128 Dismissal of the derivative
suit could only be done by an independent committee, working
with special counsel free from corporate ties. Its findings of fact
would need to be documented in a written report.129
In general, the courts have not agreed with the ALI's duty of
care proposal. 130 Courts are thought to lack the expertise and in-
formation necessary for them to make complicated business deci-
sions. Thus, in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 131
the court said that liability will only be imposed on a director "if
he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustwor-
thy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his
duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through inat-
tention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing ...."132
Legal compliance can be secured by existing constraints. Some
states have codified the business judgment rule with a reasonable
inquiry standard.133 The reasonable inquiry standard was in-
tended to be a duty of inquiry only when the circumstances indi-
cate a need for it.134 Thus, under current law, there is no duty of
inquiry when there is an adequate presentation made by manage-
ment through an attorney, accountant, or other professional.135
In order for the director to continue his goal toward profit max-
imization, the business judgment rule is needed to protect him.
The director will be constrained by the market conditions to make
thoughtful decisions. The director should be left to balance the
cost of securing additional information against the anticipated
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 44-45.
129. Fischel, supra note 46, at 1291. This involves a large expenditure without a
guarantee that it is cost-justified. See also Fischel, "The Race to the Bottom" Revis-
ited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U.L. REV. 913, 941 (1982).
130. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), afid,
188 A.2d 125 (1963) (at least gross negligence must be found to hold a director lia-
ble for bad business judgment). See also Harman v. Willbern, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th
Cir. 1975) (upheld the business judgment rule).
131. 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
132. Id. at 130.
133. CAL CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977).
134. Id.
135. This means that a director may reasonably rely on the information sup-
plied by a professional.
benefits he would receive. If the ALI's duty of care proposal is
adopted, directors will have no qualms about spending extra
money, even if a decision is trivial because they will be deterred
by the possibility of prosecution for not making a deliberate deci-
sion. These direct costs will come out of the shareholders' pock-
ets, indicating that present market constraints are more beneficial
than future court imposed liability in making the necessary busi-
ness decisions. 136
If the Restatement were adopted, three major factors would
have to be reevaluated: (1) the courts' ability to evaluate the mer-
its of business judgments; 37 (2) the deterrence the directors will
face when taking risks or focusing their attention on matters that
seem crucial at the time; 38 and (3) that highly qualified individu-
als will be discouraged from becoming directors.139 Judge
Learned Hand said that if detailed supervision of the business
were required, it would take most of the director's time, and if he
had time to do that, there would be no need for directors.14o
The courts, presently, are required only to delve into the rea-
sons behind the director's decisions when it appears the director
used bad faith in arriving at his conclusion.141 This approach is
necessary for the corporation to make money. The director can-
not fear that his every decision will be subjected to litigation; he
must be free to make decisions in order to reduce corporate costs
and make better decisions. 42
In order to retain the important role the director plays, he must
continue to be an educated, experienced, and intelligent individ-
ual. "The Business Judgment Rule grew principally from the ju-
dicial concern that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity
would not serve as directors if the law exacted from them a de-
gree of prescience not possessed by people of ordinary
knowledge."143 In order to preserve this integrity, the business
judgment rule must not be diluted to the point where experienced
136. See generally Fischel, supra note 46, at 1291. Allowing a derivative suit be-
cause it enhances state or federal public policy forces investors to subsidize the
litigation, making the derivative suit less valuable.
137. STATEMENT OF THE BusiNEss ROUNyrABLE, supra note 46, at 50. See, e.g.,
Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982) (a court should not
play a management role for which it is not suited).
138. STATEMENT OF THE BusNEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 46, at 50.
139. Id.
140. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F.2d 614, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
141. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 891.
142. See generally Fischel, supra note 46, at 1291.
143. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 93, 97
(1979).
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people will not become directors for fear of being sued for even
the most trivial decisions. 1 "
V. CONCLUSION
In every corporation, the goal of the directors is to maximize
the profits of the corporation. 45 Social costs must be of secon-
dary concern to the conscientious corporate director. He is
elected not for his social policies, but his ability to make the cor-
poration run profitably. Of course, the director must also concern
himself with issues such as pollution, 146 foreign payments,147 and
civil rights.148 But control of these social problems cannot be
achieved by placing tighter constraints on the board of directors.
The solution, therefore, is not to impose requirements for the di-
rectors to establish new social policies, but to have the legislature
pass new laws. This lack of constraint would allow the directors
greater managerial flexibility than the proposed monitoring
theory.
The monitoring theory, however, 49 is not disastrous per se.
Most large corporations have already adopted a form of the moni-
toring model. Additionally, most corporations have adopted audit,
nomination, and compensation committees. 50 This, however,
does not suggest there should be a black letter law requiring
every corporation to follow the monitoring model and committee
recommendations. Each corporation has its own unique strategy
and personality, and is best able to know the structure suited to
its business. If the directors are not functioning properly, the
stockholders have existing adequate remedies: the stockholder
144. See generally STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUND'rABLE, supra note 46, at
50.
145. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
146. E.g., Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy, 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. I 1977) (allowing federal, state, and local governments to use
all practical means to create and maintain conditions essential to preserving the
natural environment).
147. E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, dd-2
(Supp. V 1981) (requiring foreign securities to be registered with the SEC in order
to ensure fair dealing).
148. E.g., Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) (liability for
the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution).
149. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
may bring an action in most states for removal for cause,' 5 ' or he
may sell his shares. 152 If enough shareholders decide that the di-
rectors are doing an inadequate job, the shareholders can sell
their shares, thereby dropping stock prices and forcing the com-
pany to reevaluate its position.153
Many corporations also currently employ a majority of outside
directors. 5 4 The employment of outside directors, however,
should not be a mandatory provision for the corporation. Rather,
a proper balance should be struck with each individual corpora-
tion based on its individual needs for specialization. There is
nothing inherently wrong with insiders on the board if there is an
adequate number of outsiders to enable their presence to be
known.5 Outside directors should have a particular skill so that
they can conduct an efficient examination of that area. Each di-
rector could make a good faith decision based on another knowl-
edgeable board member's finding of fact.
In addition, each director should have at his disposal the right
to hire advisors.156 These advisors should be experts in their
chosen field; they would form an advisory committee to the board.
The advisory committee should not be mandatory, but it could
help the board dispose of problems beyond the scope of the indi-
vidual director's knowledge. This advisory committee could also
enable the directors to decide matters which the directors think
are of a trivial nature. Furthermore, the director could justifiably
rely on the committee and avoid liability by reason of the busi-
ness judgment rule.
To achieve the goal of a balanced board, good directors must be
found and elected. In achieving this goal, directors must be as-
sured discretion in their decision-making processes. Good faith
should be the only restraint on a director in making corporate de-
cisions. Since profit-making is based on risk-taking, it should be
left to the experienced business judgment of the director to de-
cide which course is best, and the courts should not inject them-
151. This means that a stockholder may bring an action against a director for
bad faith. Bad faith is not protected by the business judgment rule. See generally
HENN, supra note 9, at 1035.
152. This is also known as the "Wall Street Rule." See supra note 78 and ac-
companying text.
153. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
155. An adequate number of outsiders is the number necessary to determine
whether the inside directors are using good faith and are not overstepping the
bounds of their authority. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
156. This right to hire an advisor is allowed any time a director feels that the
issue facing the company is important and the director does not have the requisite
skills to understand or adequately deal with the problem. The advisor would be
paid by the company.
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selves into a management role for which they are neither trained
nor competent. The business judgment rule157 should remain in
force.
IRA S. LEVINE
157. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

